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1 The “old-guard” are founding members of the PLO and Fatah.  The “young-guard” are generally
comprised of key actors in the first intifada and seek an increased role in the national movement.
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Summary
On January 15, 2005, Mahmoud Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Mazen) was sworn in as
President of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Many believe that the Abbas victory marks
the end of an autocratic era dominated by the late Yasir Arafat and the increased
possibility of improved prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.  This report details
Abbas’s policy platform and potential challenges he may face from within and without
the Palestinian political landscape.  Domestic challenges include Israel’s planned
withdrawal from Gaza, continuing municipal and parliamentary elections, violent anti-
occupation elements, calls for financial, judicial, and security reform, as well as a
paralyzed economy.  Abbas also faces multiple challenges in creating a viable
Palestinian state based on a secure peace with Israel:  the requirements of the “Road
Map,” Palestinian violence toward Israel, and final status issues, such as the future of
Jerusalem, refugees, and final political borders.  This report will be updated as
necessary.
Palestinian Centers of Power
Fatah.  Under Arafat, Fatah became the most prominent political party in the
Palestinian territories.  The leading political body within  Fatah is the Central Committee
(CC), elected by the general membership.  Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (RC) parallels
the CC as a decision-making body and does not exclude armed resistance as an option.
On November 21, 2004, Fatah nominated Mahmoud Abbas as its presidential candidate.
Some analysts claim any credibility that a moderate Abbas may have within Fatah hinges
on a compromise between “old-guard” CC Members and the RC “young-guard”.1
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  The PLO describes itself as “the
embodiment of the Palestinian national movement,” and for four decades it was
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dominated by Arafat.2  The PLO is organized into three political bodies: the Palestine
National Council, a parliamentary body; the Central Council, a 124 member
decision-making body; and the 18-member Executive Committee, which elects the
Chairman of the PLO.  After the death of Arafat, the Executive Committee elected
Mahmoud Abbas Chairman of the PLO.
Palestinian Authority (PA) & Elections.  On January 9, 2005, the PA held
presidential elections (which Hamas boycotted), and Fatah candidate Mahmoud Abbas
was certified winner and President-elect.  The first two rounds of municipal elections
(held in January and May) resulted in Abbas’ Fatah party winning 60 municipalities and
Hamas winning 48.  Two more municipal rounds are expected in September and
December 2005.  Palestinian legislative elections were expected to be held in July 2005,
but have been postponed.  Party elections are to take place later in 2005.
Table 1.  January 9, 2005, Palestinian 
Presidential Election Results
Candidates Votes (%) Votes (total)
Mahmoud Abbas 65.52 501,448
Mustufa Barghouti 19.48 156,227 
Tayseer Khaled 3.35 26,848
Abd Alhalim Ashqar 2.76 22,171
Basam Al Salhi 2.67 21,429
Assayed Barakeh 1.30 10,406
Abd Al-Karim Shbair 0.71 5,717
Source: Palestinian Central Elections Commission.
Positions on Internal Security and Reform Challenges
Security Services.  Most analysts agree that PA security reform is necessary in
order to halt violence directed against Israel and provide stability for a future Palestinian
state.  In 2005, the PA National Security Council (NSC) was formed as a first step in
consolidating security elements.3  According to the legislation, as President, Abbas is
supreme commander of three institutions which consolidate dozens of security services:
General Intelligence (unifies PA intelligence organs), General Security (civil and
preventive services), and the National Security Council (the basis of a possible armed
force).  Recently, Secretary of State Rice stated that the “United States is prepared to help
train Palestinian security forces.”4   Egypt has also offered to train Palestinian security
forces.  On April 23, 2005, Abbas appointed Brigadier General Sulayman Abu-Mutlaq
commander of general security in the Gaza Strip.  Brigadier General  Ziyad Hab-al-Rih
is in charge of general security affairs in the West Bank.5  Many experts view these
developments as positive, noting that Abbas is attempting to rein in disparate intelligence
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apparatuses.  Still others contend that organizational reform masks underlying problems
of a lack of power-sharing and vaguely assigned duties.6
Corruption and Reform.  The PA has been criticized repeatedly for non-
transparency, corruption, and cronyism, and Palestinian opinion surveys consistently
reveal  public displeasure over corruption. However, some international assessments have
acknowledged progress in Palestinian judicial, economic, and political reforms.  Abbas
has stated the need for the PA to “continue to implement and develop its reform plan.”7
On March 1, 2005, Britain hosted a conference on Palestinian reform.  At the conference,
the European Union pledged to assist with the establishment of new Palestinian
institutions; the United States committed to setting up a security coordinating group; and
the World Bank stated its intention to assist in economic development.  Many feel that the
retention of Salem Fayyad as Finance Minister is also a positive step for reforms.
Economic Conditions.  One of the most pressing domestic issues Abbas  faces
is economic stagnation.  A recent World Bank report warns of “the potential
disintegration of the Palestinian economy under the sustained pressure of conflict and
Israeli closure policies.”8  Many analysts agree that openly contested, free elections, and
ongoing reforms may increase the likelihood of international aid to Palestinians,
particularly from the United States.  According to one report, “people voted for Abbas
because they believed that he would be able to bring them jobs, and improve their living
conditions.”9  On March 31, the Palestinian Legislative Council approved a $2.2 billion
budget for 2005.  The budget assumes that pledges of $1.2 billion in international aid,
made at the March 1, 2005, London Conference, will be included.  James Wolfensohn,
outgoing head of the World Bank, was recently appointed special representative to Gaza
to coordinate reconstruction efforts after Israel’s planned withdrawal from Gaza. 
The Palestinian Opposition.  Nationalist groups like the al-Aksa Martyrs
Brigade and Islamists like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad oppose many PA
bilateral agreements with Israel and continue to advocate violent resistance to the
occupation.  However, some, most notably Hamas, have indicated a degree of pragmatism
and flexibility in recent statements vis-a-vis the PA and Israel.  For example, Mahmoud
Zahar, a leading Hamas figure, recently expressed  interest in joining the PLO.10  Secular
groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the People’s Party are often critical of PA
policies but  work alongside the PLO in a loose political coalition, voicing dissent within
the body politic. Some report that Fatah may form a united nationalist-democratic front
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to challenge Hamas, which is expected to join the Palestinian political system after the
2005 elections.11  
Peace and the “Road Map”
Violence.  The sustained violence since September 2000 has greatly affected both
Palestinians and Israelis.12  At the June 2003 Aqaba Summit, Abbas stated, “there will be
no military solution for this conflict, so we repeat our renunciation of terrorism against
the Israelis wherever they might be.”13  Since then, Abbas has continually denounced
violence as a means to achieve independence, instead calling for popular and social means
to end the Israeli occupation.  Congress has noted President Abbas’s denunciation of
terror as a means of securing a Palestinian state.14
 Israel briefly ended talks with Abbas (January 14-19, 2005) after a bombing
occurred at a crossing point between Israel and Gaza. This was seen, by some, as
indicative of Prime Minister Sharon’s mistrust of Abbas’s commitment to ending violence
and as an effort to push Abbas to act rapidly.  Others see Abbas as a fully committed
partner for peace, as evidenced by his deployment of security forces in Gaza to halt
attacks on Israeli settlements and military personnel.  On February 8, 2005, President
Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon discussed Israeli-Palestinian security measures to
decrease armed violence.  As a result of the meeting, and despite sporadic violence,
Sharon and Abbas agreed, in principle, to a unilateral cease-fire.15  Random attacks
against Israel (mostly in Gaza) have continued.  Notably, Hamas claimed responsibility
for launching 26 mortars and a number of anti-tank rockets at settlements and army
outposts in Gaza on May 18, injuring one Israeli.  However, an Israeli intelligence officer
credited Palestinian security services with preventing many attacks.16
Israeli Closures.  In the spring of 2002, Israel implemented a series of village,
town, and city closures and curfews in an effort to reduce violence. Many claim that
restricting the flow of Palestinian goods and people within and between the West Bank,
Gaza, and Israel, hampers Palestinian economic activity and may increase militancy.
Others cite Israel’s need to ensure its citizens protection by drastically limiting the
movement and supplies of Palestinian militants. In his presidential inaugural address,
Abbas stated “our hand is outstretched to the Israeli partner to make peace, not with words
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but with deeds, and put an end to closures, arrests and the building of the fence.”17  To
date, Israeli officials have transferred the security responsibility of two towns (Jericho and
Tulkarem) to the PA, with three more (Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Qalqilyah) to come.
Recently, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz announced a freeze to these transfers due
to the PA’s lack of action against Palestinian violence.18
Israeli Separation Barrier.  In April 2002, in reaction to Palestinian suicide-
bombings, Israel approved the construction of a barrier between Israeli and Palestinian-
held territory, largely built inside the Palestinian side of the “Green Line” (the 1967 cease-
fire line separating the West Bank from Israel).19  Some Israelis contend their security
depends on the construction of the barrier, noting decreased suicide bombings in Israel
since the barrier’s construction.  Critics of the barrier see it as de facto Israeli annexation
of portions of the occupied West Bank.  President Abbas claims “the removal of the wall
will be among the first issues that our government will address because, without its
removal, Israel will effectively destroy the Roadmap.”20
Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Commitments.  Released on April 30, 2003, the
framework (or “Road Map”) envisions a three-stage process comprising reciprocal steps
leading to a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel by 2009.21  President Abbas
has expressed support for the Road Map and its implementation.  In a visit to the United
States in May 2005, President Abbas noted that several questions remained unanswered
relating to the planned Israeli withdrawal and other commitments.
Prisoner Release.  A core domestic issue for Abbas is the release of Palestinian
political prisoners.  Abbas has publicly stated “in principle we work for every prisoner to
be released, but what we are looking for is the release of those who have spent many long
years in jail.”22  On December 27, 2004, an  agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the PA
culminated with the release of 159 Palestinian political prisoners; on January 3, 2005,
Israeli Cabinet ministers approved the release of an additional 900 Palestinian prisoners
and on February 21, 2005 the first 500 prisoners of these were released.  On June 2, 2005,
Israel released 400 more Palestinians.  Some experts see this development merely as an
Israeli gesture of goodwill towards Abbas; others view the release as a first step toward
the wider release of an estimated 7,000 political prisoners.
Jerusalem.  Israel claims Jerusalem as its undivided capital, while Palestinians
seek to establish a capital for their state in East Jerusalem.  Abbas repeatedly has called
for the capital of any Palestinian state be located in the eastern portion of Jerusalem.
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There are also reports that Israeli internal security forces are preparing for possible
confrontations between Jewish extremists and Palestinian Muslims near the al-Aqsa
mosque, Islam’s third most venerated site.23  In April 2005, Israeli police arrested Jewish
militants on suspicion they were planning to attack the al-Aqsa mosque.
Refugees.  President Abbas, himself a refugee, has made several unequivocal
statements in support of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, claiming Palestinian
refugees and their descendants from the war that followed Israel’s creation in 1948 have
the right to return to their original homes.24  Some have suggested that Abbas may relax
his stance on the refugee issue depending on the outcome of other outstanding issues.
Issues for Congress
U.S. Aid to the Palestinians.25  Since 1993, Congress has authorized over $1.5
billion in assistance to the Palestinians, generally distributed via third parties such as the
U.S. Agency for International Development and private voluntary organizations.  Funds
are also distributed to Palestinians through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA).  The executive branch has granted assistance directly to the PA on three
occasions: in 1994, $10 million was distributed to the PA through the Holst Fund at the
World Bank; on July 8, 2003, $20 million was granted to the PA for infrastructure
projects; and on December 8, 2004, President Bush approved $20 million for Palestinian
utility payments to Israel.26  The FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L.
109-113, May 11, 2005) calls for $200 million to be made available for programs to
support the Palestinians.  On May 25, 2005, President Bush announced his intention to
steer $50 million directly to the PA to be used in Gaza. 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace.  President Bush has stated that the establishment of
a Palestinian state, living next to a secure Israel, is a top priority for his second term.27
During his visit to Washington in May 2005, President Abbas reiterated his strong
commitment to the peace process, ending terror and incitement, and to achieving
Palestinian goals through political negotiations.  President Abbas and Israeli Prime
Minister Sharon are set to meet on June 21, 2005, to further coordinate Israel’s planned
withdrawal from Gaza. 
